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A commentary on
The effects of distraction on metacogn-
ition and metacognition on distraction:
evidence from recognition memory
by Beaman, C. P., Hanczakowski, M., and
Jones, D. M. (2014). Front. Psychol. 5:439.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00439
The work in the Research Topic illustrates
the growing interest in the effects of dis-
traction upon cognitive performance, in
particular memory. In their excellent arti-
cle, Beaman et al. (2014) point out that
the majority of previous work on this
topic has used memory tasks that allow
little opportunity for the participants to
demonstrate metacognitive monitoring or
control of their performance. Given the
myriad demonstrations of the influences
of metacognitive monitoring and control
on memory performance, this is a clear
omission. For example, students studying
for an exammay judge their own degree of
learning (monitoring) and decide whether
or not to study further (control). Similarly,
eyewitnesses may evaluate their confidence
in their memory (monitoring) and decide
whether or not to make a positive identi-
fication decision (control). The paper sets
out to investigate (1) whether distraction
influences metacognition, as well as mem-
ory itself and (2) whether metacognition
contributes to memory impairments.
Beaman and colleagues investigate
distraction in the context of Koriat and
Goldsmith’s (1996) memory-control
framework. This framework proposes that
memory output in response to a cue is
the result of three steps: generation of
a best candidate answer, monitoring the
quality of that answer (measured by con-
fidence), and an output decision based
upon comparing the monitored quality
with output goals (measured by looking
at the propensity to withhold answers).
By comparing performance on tasks that
allow withholding of answers (free-report)
with performance on tasks that do not
allow such control (forced-report), Koriat
and Goldsmith were able to determine the
trade-off between memory quantity and
memory accuracy. Beaman and colleagues
examined the effects of distraction on all
aspects of the framework, by looking at:
(a) the number of correct answers avail-
able (reflected in forced-report measures),
(b) subjective assessments of the accuracy
of candidate answers (reflected in confi-
dence measures), and (c) the threshold at
which participants are willing to report
an answer (reflected in free-report and
confidence measures).
In line with established effects in the
literature, Beaman and colleagues show
that distraction impacted upon retrieval
of candidate answers (e.g., Glenberg et al.,
1998; Vredeveldt et al., 2011; Perfect et al.,
2012; Rae and Perfect, 2014). This is reas-
suring, but not new. The strength of the
paper lies in the examination of metacog-
nitive components of performance, which
is both novel and thorough. Beaman and
colleagues found that distraction impacted
upon some, but not all metacognitivemea-
sures. Under distraction, participants were
less able to distinguish their correct from
incorrect answers (resolution). Whilst dis-
traction did not affect the accuracy of
answers volunteered in free report, it did
result in fewer correct answers being vol-
unteered. An intriguing aspect of perfor-
mance was that distraction caused people
to withhold answers more often, but did
not change report threshold (as measured
by confidence). Further detailed analy-
sis demonstrated that this pattern arose
because distraction lowered confidence in
correct answers. As a result, participants
found it harder to distinguish correct from
incorrect answers and said “don’t know”
more often, despite maintaining the same
criterion for outputting an answer.
Beaman and colleagues’ examination
of the impact of distraction on differ-
ent metacognitive indices is both ele-
gant and informative. It opens a fruitful
avenue of research for others to follow,
with clear theoretical and practical rel-
evance. Four important issues spring to
mind, but others will no doubt be inspired
to take a different route. The authors
themselves note that one issue will be
to disentangle the effects of distraction
on metacognition during encoding and
retrieval, because the methodology used
had distraction during both phases, but
only measured metacognitive indices dur-
ing retrieval. Disentangling these effects
would address clear applied questions, for
example: does distraction impair the abil-
ity to judge the degree of learning (cf.
(Banbury and Berry, 1998; Hygge et al.,
2003)), or the appropriate allocation of
study time?
A related issue will be to investigate
the effects of distraction on metacogni-
tion when memory quality varies. Many
factors can impair the quality of the mem-
ory trace, for example, distraction or low
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attention during encoding, or long delays
between encoding and retrieval. This
raises the possibility that the metacog-
nitive changes observed by Beaman and
colleagues were not due to distraction dur-
ing retrieval, but were the result of having
to monitor lower-quality memory traces
(due to distraction during encoding). This
argument mirrors exactly the debate in
another domain: the accuracy of feeling-
of-knowing (FOK) judgements in younger
and older adults. Whilst there is gen-
eral agreement that older adults’ episodic
FOK judgements are less accurate, some
have attributed this to poor monitoring
at retrieval (Souchay et al., 2007), whilst
others have attributed it to poor encoding
(Perfect and Stollery, 1993; Hertzog et al.,
2010).
The third issue concerns the nature of
distraction: the present paper uses seman-
tically meaningful, verbal distraction that
is similar to the to-be-remembered mate-
rial. It is unknown to what extent other
forms of distraction impair metacogni-
tive monitoring and control. Meaningless
distraction during retrieval, such as mov-
ing shapes (Perfect et al., 2012), white
noise (Perfect et al., 2011), or street noise
(Vredeveldt and Penrod, 2013), has been
found to impact memory performance,
but these studies have lacked the metacog-
nitive approach developed here (but cf.
Vredeveldt and Sauer, 2015).
The final issue that remains unexplored
is the impact of distraction upon sensitiv-
ity to output goals. Beaman and colleagues
encouraged participants to maximize
accuracy in free report, but there was no
systematic variation in rewards and penal-
ties associated with correct and incorrect
responses. Koriat and Goldsmith (1994)
found that people adjust their report
threshold when the penalty for error is
a small financial penalty, or the loss of
all accrued rewards. Distraction could
affect this strategic adjustment of report
threshold.
In summary, Beaman and colleagues
provide a stimulating approach to the
examination of effects of distraction on
performance, reminding us that memory
retrieval in humans is the result of a subtle
interplay between basic cognitive processes
andmetacognitive monitoring and control
of those processes. They demonstrate that
metacognitive impairments resulting from
distraction can impair memory perfor-
mance, and they offer a broad and sophis-
ticated array of metacognitive measures
with which to explore these issues. Our
hope is that this work stimulates others to
follow.
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